Analysis
Most security programmes protect laptops well and executives' calendars badly. The second gap is harder to write a control for, and it is where Nvidia's week began.
Nvidia's longtime chief security officer, David Reber, stepped down in August, citing health reasons he described publicly, TechCrunch reported. His successor is Saša Zdjelar, previously at ExxonMobil, Salesforce and ReversingLabs. About ten weeks later, chief executive Jensen Huang resigned amid reports about his relationships, including one with an executive at Megaspeed, a Singapore data-centre company U.S. investigators suspect of funnelling Nvidia chips to China.
Confirmed: the resignation, the change of security chief, and a board statement that it had no reason to believe national security or Nvidia secrets were compromised. Reported: the relationships, and, per the New York Times, that Nvidia's top lawyer had engaged with the government's Megaspeed inquiry more than a year ago. Unknown: whether the security team was told, and what it was asked to assess. Zdjelar did not respond to TechCrunch's questions.
The useful lesson is not about one man. Executive insider risk usually sits between legal, security and the board, and nobody owns it until something goes wrong. Three questions for anyone running a programme: who is told when an executive is linked to a company under investigation? Who decides whether that is a security matter? And does that decision survive a change of security chief?
Source: Where was Nvidia’s security team? · 2026-11-14 · Excerpt only · full context unverified
Why it matters
A transition at the top of security and an unassessed executive risk can coincide anywhere; the fix is a named owner, not a bigger budget.
